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The professional team sports industry is characterized by ﬁ  ve major peculiarities. 
First, there are hardly any opportunities for productivity gains in this industry. On 
the output side, the number of championships that can be produced is limited. On the 
input side, the room for productivity gains is limited as well. In soccer, for example, 
clubs cannot increase their productivity by playing without their left defender even if 
this allowed their opponents to cut their right wing, eliminate one linesman, and so 
forth. Second, competition in professional team sports exhibits signiﬁ  cant externali-
ties. Since output in terms of team rankings is limited, each team cannot improve 
its output (ranking) without the externality of worsening the rank of at least one 
opponent. Third, there are probably more monopolies in professional team sports 
than in any other industry. Teams often enjoy local monopolies. Competing leagues 
usually do not survive for longer periods. Either one league becomes too dominant and 
drives out its competitors or the competing leagues merge to form a monopoly. Due 
to its peculiarities and perhaps its popularity, the professional team sports industry 
enjoys several exemptions from common antitrust regulations. For example, salary 
caps, transfer restrictions, and centralized marketing by league-monopolies would 
not be tolerated in other industries. These exceptions result in very interesting labor 
market peculiarities within professional team sports. Fourth, the so called uncertainty 
of outcome hypothesis suggests that competitive balance increases fan demand. In 
other industries, ﬁ  rms prefer weak competitors. In professional team sports, weak 
opponents cannot draw large crowds and are therefore economically unattractive. 
Fifth, professional team sports creates various satellite markets which may generate 
even larger revenues than the primary sports market. A typical example of such a 
satellite market is the betting market.
These peculiarities make the industry of professional team sports an interesting 
research ﬁ  eld for economists. Since the industry is organized differently across the 
world and we even can often observe different institutional arrangements within a 
given country, professional team sports is an interesting source of natural experi-
ments. Moreover, the industry is rich in easily accessible data.
This symposium of three selected papers has been assembled from two sessions 
on sports economics at the 2006 annual conference of the Eastern Economic Associa-
tion in Philadelphia. The ﬁ  rst paper by Brandes and Franck empirically analyzes 
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increases with competitive balance: the more balanced a league is the larger will be 
its overall attendance. Brandes and Franck estimate vector autoregressive models 
based on seasonal average attendance data in German, English, Italian and French 
professional football in the seasons 1963/64 to 2005/06. Using an idealized standard 
deviation of winning percentages, the CR5 concentration ratio, and the Herﬁ  ndahl-
index, they ﬁ  nd signiﬁ  cant differences in the relationship between attendance and 
competitive balance across countries and even within countries across hierarchical 
leagues. Granger causality tests indicate that fan attendance does not necessarily 
react to changes in competitive balance. For Germany’s ﬁ  rst division and Italy’s 
Serie A, for example, Brandes and Franck even ﬁ  nd evidence that changes in fan 
demand determine the level of competitive balance. These results have important 
policy implications because many professional leagues have implemented a number 
of redistributive mechanisms (e.g., revenue sharing or reverse order drafts) in order 
to enhance competitive balance.
In the second paper, Dietl and Hasan compare the European and North American 
markets for sports broadcasting. In practically all major leagues around the world, 
income out of broadcasting rights has replaced gate receipts as the most important 
source of revenue. Based on a four-stage game-theoretical model, they identify three 
main determinants for the sale of sports broadcasting rights. First, free-TV networks 
are more likely to outbid their pay-TV competitors if the regulator imposes a less 
restrictive price cap on the free-TV network. This price cap is equivalent to a mini-
mum quantity (in terms of the number of viewers) of sports broadcasting on free-TV. 
Second, major sports leagues are more likely to sell exclusive broadcasting rights to 
free-TV networks even if their bid is lower than the bid of their pay-TV rival given 
that the league’s sponsorship income is highly sensitive to television viewer ratings. 
Third, major league sports is more likely to be aired on free-TV if viewers’ demand is 
highly price elastic. These results are consistent with the empirical fact that TV cover-
age of professional football (soccer) in Europe has moved to subscription TV whereas 
major league team sports in the U.S. is aired primarily on free-TV. In the U.S., FCC 
legislation restricts the entrance of subscription-based networks. In addition, free-
TV networks enjoy economies of scale due to the large national market. Moreover, 
competition between major team sports is much more pronounced in the U.S. than 
in Europe which results in a larger substitution effect and higher price elasticities of 
viewers and higher viewer rating sensitivity of sponsors.
In the third paper Frick, Pietzner, and Prinz analyze the labor market for soc-
cer players in Germany. Based on detailed information for every single player who 
appeared in at least one match in Germany’s top division between 1963 and 2003, 
Frick et al. study the determinants of career duration in professional team sports. 
Interestingly, more than one third of all players disappear after their ﬁ  rst season 
and only one career out of twelve lasts for ten years or more. These results suggest 
that professional team sports is a short-term and high-risk career opportunity. As 
expected, the most important determinant of career duration is a player’s performance. 
However, Frick et al. also ﬁ  nd some evidence for discrimination of East European 
players. The data also provides opportunities for further research, such as testing of 
the Coase Theorem.